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TORTS-COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-EVALUATION.
I.
Comparative negligence, generally stated, is a rule whereby an injured
plaintiff who, himself, is guilty of negligence which operated concurrently
with that of the defendant to become the proximate cause of the injury,
may recover if the degree of his negligence is slight as compared with that
of the defendant.' It is frequently and more descriptively referred to as
the "apportionment of damages" rule. It is that area of the law and its
implications to which this Comment is addressed. No attempt will be made
to consider the vast area of the law which is neatly summed up under
the title "Negligence" or to give a full picture of that segment known as
contributory negligence except as it is directly relevant for contrast and
placing the rule of comparative negligence in proper prospective. A word
as to what is not comparative negligence seems appropriate at this point
because of the confusion which sometimes arises owing to a failure to
realize the distinction between comparative negligence and the rule of con-
tributory negligence which bars recovery if the plaintiff's negligence was
a proximate cause of the injury. Some cases where a negligent plaintiff
has been permitted recovery have been viewed as adhering to the compara-
tive negligence rule, whereas actually the only reason the action was not de-
feated was because the plaintiff's negligence was irrelevant because it was
not the proximate cause of the injury.2 In jurisdictions where the rule
of comparative negligence is not followed the plaintiff is barred from re-
covery because of his own negligence if it is a proximate cause of the
injury. Having this distinction in mind will prevent a misunderstanding
of the problem.
II.
The doctrine of contributory negligence which bars a plaintiff from
recovery for his injuries, if, by his own act, no matter how slight, he has
proximately contributed to his misfortune, did not exist at the early common
law. The doctrine is first reported in England in 1809 in the case of
Butterfield v. Forrester,3 where it was said that one man's negligence
did not preclude the necessity of another's taking ordinary precautions to
safeguard himself. Fifteen years later this rule was adopted in the United
States 4 and by 1854 courts were citing it as a fixed rule of law.5 So
harsh were the results which flowed from the application of this rule that
within a few years the courts in England sought relief from the doctrine.
1. Kerr v. Forgue, 54 Ill. 482 (1870) ; Wichita & Western R.R. v. Davis, 37
Kan. 743 (1887).
2. Mc Caa v. Thomas, 207 Ala. 211, 92 So. 414 (1922) ; Atlanta & Birmingham
Air Line Ry. v. Wheeler, 154 Ala. 530, 46 So. 262 (1908).
3. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
4. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824).
5. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147 (1854).
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They succeeded in establishing the "last clear chance" or "humanitarian"
doctrine. 6 This rule was widely accepted in the United States although
its meaning and interpretation varied among the states.1
It was upon this historical background that the courts, notably those
of Illinois and Kansas, began to make a judicial comparison of the fault
of the parties in determining the amount of damages in cases where both
parties were negligent in a proximately causative manner. The plaintiff's
negligence was found not to be a total bar to recovery but upon satisfaction
of the court that it was only slight as compared to the gross failure of care
on the part of the defendant, the damage figure was diminished by an
amount reflecting the degree to which the plaintiff had been negligent.8
This is the judicial doctrine of comparative negligence.
With a resurgence of the importance of the rule of contributory negli-
gence, the courts began to cite Butterfield v. Forrester as the common-law
rule and judicial approval of an apportionment of damages became almost
extinct. In fact, such apportionment was expressly repudiated in most
American jurisdictions. 9  The rule next emerged in statutes. The speci-
fications for its use vary. However, the most widespread situation in
which it is invoked is in the employer-employee relationship, and particu-
larly in cases involving common carriers. In these situations there were
many "hard" cases. A moment's lapse could visit great hardship upon a
worker who had been a model of carefulness, and in the face of an em-
ployer's failure to offer sufficient safeguards for the welfare of his em-
ployees. The Federal Employer's Liability Act is a concise statement of
the comparative negligence rule. 10 Some forty states now have compara-
6. Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). The theory
of this doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant by exercising
reasonable care and prudence might have avoided injurious consequence to the plain-
tiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence.
7. There is at least one major division which is noticeable among the courts
which apply this doctrine. One group makes the existence of actual knowledge
in the defendant a prerequisite to application of the doctrine while the other group
finds that if in the exercise of due care the defendant should have known of the
plaintiff's peril, this is sufficient. See Chunn v. City & Suburban Ry., 207 U.S.
302 (1907) on the former view, and Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S.E.
53 (1931) on the latter.
8. Kerr v. Forgue, 54 Ill. 482 (1870) ; Galena & Chicago Union R.R. v. Fay,
16 Ill. 558 (1855) ; Wichita & Western R.R. v. Davis, 37 Kan. 743 (1887).
9. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Hamler, 215 11. 525, 74 N.E. 705 (1905); Union
Trust Co. v. Detroit, G.H. & M. Ry., 239 Mich. 97, 214 N.W. 166 (1927); New
Jersey Express Co. v. Nichols, 33 N.J.L. 434 (1867); Falk v. Crystal Hall, Inc.,
200 Misc. 979, 105 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1071, 113
N.Y.S.2d 277 (1st Dep't 1952); Building Supply Co. v. Mc Cabe, 336 Pa. 322,
77 A.2d 368 (1951) ; Tesch v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 108 Wis. 593,
84 N.W. 823 (1901).
10. 35 STAT. 66, 45 U.S.C. §53 (1952). The text of the section is: "In all
actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by
virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal in-
juries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact
that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar
a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to such employee; Provided, That no such em-
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tive negligence statutes governing at least some negligence cases. Many are
imitations of the federal law. Mississippi and Nebraska make the utiliza-
tion of the rule most general," the former being the only state which makes
it applicable to all negligence cases. The other jurisdictions which include
the rule as part of their law make its applicability depend upon the par-
ticular type of situation set forth in the statute. 12  As indicated earlier
these may include workmen's compensation cases, suits against common
carriers, employer-employee suits generally, and combinations of these.
Employing the rule of comparative negligence as opposed to that of
contributory negligence may result in full recovery rather than the usual
bar, '3 but generally a diminution of damages is the end intended and
achieved.1 4  As a prerequisite to recovery some of the statutes provide
that there must be a finding that the plaintiff's negligence was "slight" as
compared to "gross" on the part of the defendant.' 5 This imitates the
test used by the courts in the early days of the rule. To use this test the
court must evaluate each party's fault in order to satisfy the statute. Liti-
gation as to the class of each party's fault is a necessity under this type of
statute. Another manner of stating the requisites for recovery in cases
where dual negligence is present is that the plaintiff's negligence be less
than that of the defendant.' 6 This proves to be a more workable test for
the courts.
The acceptability and form of the rule of comparative negligence in any
jurisdiction, then, is very much dependent upon the existence and stipula-
tions of a statute. In England the trend toward comparative negligence and
away from contributory negligence has been the same in principle though
somewhat different in form. As already stated, the "last clear chance"
doctrine found an early entry into the law of England after the emergence
and extensive acceptance of the doctrine of contributory negligence. 17 A
more recent innovation into the English law of torts was that of requiring
a different standard of care from an employee than from the employer.' 8
ployee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any
statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of
such employee."
11. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942); NEE. REv. STAT. §25-1151 (1953).
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 229 §§ 2, 2A, 20 (1933); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-103
(1941) ; S.D. GEN. LAWS c. 160 p. 184 (1941) (all cases of negligent damage to
person or property); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 2628-30 (Williams 1934) ; WIs. STAT.
§ 331.045 (1953) (all cases of negligent damage to person or property).
13. Barnhart v. Pere Marquette R.R., 188 Mich. 537, 155 N.W. 355 (1915).
14. Reed v. Paldwin, 192 Ark. 491, 92 S.W.2d 392 (1936) ; Sgroi v. Yellow
Cab & Baggage Co., 124 Neb. 525, 247 N.W. 355 (1933) ; Englebrecht v. Bradley,
211 Wis. 1, 247 N.W. 451 (1933).
15. NEB. REv. STAT. §25-1151 (1953).
16. Wis. STAT. §331.045 (1953).
17. Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
18. Flower v. Ebbe Vale Steel, Iron & Coal Co. [1934] 2 K.B. 132, re'd on
other grounds, [19361 A.C. 206; Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Association Collieries,
Ltd. [1940] A.C. 1952.
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This permitted the court to allow recovery to the injured employee who
had contributed to his own injury, notwithstanding the rule of contributory
negligence, by a finding that he was not negligent since he had met his less
rigorous duty of care. The necessity for this rather circuitous way of
avoiding the hardship of the contributory negligence rule was ended by
the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945.19
III.
The rule of comparative negligence, like any innovation, has an im-
pact on the existing status of the law. Naturally, the most important
change made by this rule is in the law of negligence itself. Under the
rule, fault on the part of the plaintiff should not be a bar to his recovery.
The basic rules of negligence are left unaltered. The requisite elements to
sustain a cause of action grounded on negligence remain unaltered. The
same is true of contributory negligence which is measured by the same
standards as negligence, the only difference being that the negligence is on
the part of the one seeking redress rather than the party from whom it
is sought. Thus statutes introducing comparative negligence change the
legal effect of contributory negligence, but not what constitutes contribu-
tory negligence. 20  What is brought about is a different approach to a
case involving negligence coupled with contributory negligence. The prac-
tical effect, however, is much greater. Court calendars are relieved of a
great deal of litigation. Parties are less inclined to await the workings
of justice since a settlement can be arrived at far easier in the face of an,
almost inevitable apportionment of damages.21 Precision is iniected into
the damage award for the cost to each party is representative of what
damage each has caused. For example, under English application of
the rule, in an accident where $10,000 damage has occurred to the person
or property of the two parties involved, upon an adjudication that the plain-
tiff was 30% responsible and the defendant 70%, the plaintiff would re-
cover for 70% of his loss, while the defendant would be compensated for
30% of his loss. In this manner each party pays for the damages to the
other for which he was responsible and bears the loss to the extent to
which he caused his own loss. Even though he might recover but a small
part of his loss, depending upon the percentages of responsibility, he is
better off than being denied any recovery because of the fact that he has
partially caused his own loss. 22 Under the prevailing American view, re-
covery is limited to a plaintiff who is responsible for less than 50% of the
damage.
2 3
Another important area where the rule has a decided impact is in the
field of contribution among joint tortfeasors or multiple party cases. Under
19. 8 & 9 GEo. 6, c. 28.
20. Raine v. Southern Ry., 169 N.C. 189, 85 S.E. 294 (1915).
21. See address by Dean Pound in 13 NACCA L.J. 195 (1954).
22. Jay (William A.) & Sons v. Veevers, Ltd. [1946] 1 All E.R. 646.
23. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721
(1934).
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the accepted rules regarding joint tortfeasers, each is liable for the whole
of the damages caused regardless of the degree to which he may have been
responsible even though as between himself and his joint tortfeasers he may
have the 'right to contribution. 24 Some statutes, embodying the rules of
comparative negligence, have attempted to regulate the problems of mul-
tiple parties. They have been largely unsuccessful. In an attempt to gain
the benefits of an apportionment statute to the point of limiting a defend-
ant's judgment to the percentage of the plaintiff's loss which this particular
defendant caused, the Supreme Cout of Wisconsin held that the rules reg-
ulating joint tortfeasers have been unchanged by the comparative negli-
gence statute.2 5 This seems to be the only satisfactory decision until a way
is found to work out the whole problem in a sure and equitable manner
which will safeguard the rights of all parties.
Opposition to adoption of the rule of comparative negligence is based
principally on two basic contentions. One reason, popular among the
traditionalists, is that no such provision is found at common law and that
its introduction is a radical innovation in the law. A worthier objection,
though not conclusive, is that great practical difficulties of percentage de-
termination are raised under the rule. There is no obvious yardstick by
which apportionment of negligence can be measured. A somewhat arbi-
trary figure must be assigned to the negligence of each party in order to
regulate the amount of damages which will be chargeable to each. Those
who favor the rule contend that neither objection is valid to forestall its
inclusion in the working law of a modern jurisdiction. Many innovations
have been made in the law to make it workable and to adapt it to changing
social conditions. Change for the sake of change alone is never good, and
hasty change to keep pace with every new idea is not advisable. However,
when a serious injustice is taking place under an existing rule and a time
proven solution is available, the fact that it will alter the law on the subject
should not be a bar to its acceptance. As to the difficulty in determining the
percentage of negligence, it is pointed out that this is not a new problem
in the law. All damages are to some extent arbitrary and speculative. It
is a rare case where monetary recompense can be awarded which cor-
responds exactly to each party's obligation to the other. Furthermore,
courts of many jurisdictions which do not provide for the comparison of
negligence have been handling the exact same problem in admiralty cases
and cases involving the federal law for some time. New York is an excel-
lent example.2 6 It has long been recognized that a great injustice is done
when a man guilty of a slight omission of care is made to bear the entire
brunt of a costly accident in the face of a gross failure of due care on the
24. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFFASORs Acr, adopted with some varia-
tions in Ark., Del., Md., Mich., N.M., Pa., R.I., and S.D.
25. Ready v. Hafeman, 239 Wis. 1, 300 N.W. 480 (1941).
26. Wolf v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 239 App. Div. 95, 267 N.Y. Supp. 199
(lst Dep't 1933); Mc Auliffe v. New York C. & H.R.R.R., 172 App. Div. 597, 158
N.Y. Supp. 922 (lst Dep't 1916).
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part of the other party. The rule of comparison, it is said, places as nearly
as is humanly possible the share of loss on each party in proportion to the
extent to which he was responsible. That it is more convenient not to make
a comparison of fault is not a sound reason for failing to make it. Justice
should be pursued though administration may involve inconvenience.
Support for the comparative negligence rule has come from many
noted jurists. Justice Black, in the recent case of Pope v. Talbot, in which
the admiralty rule was extended to apply to a carpenter who was working
on a ship when he was injured, said:
"The hard rule of common law under which contributory negli-
gence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely
incompatible with modern admiralty policy and practice. Exercising
its traditional discretion admiralty has developed and now follows its
own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such consideration of
contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires.
Petitioner presents no persuasive arguments that admiralty should now
adopt a discredited doctrine which automatically destroys all claims of
injured persons who have contributed to their injuries in any degree,
however slight." 27
Associate Justice Charles D. Breitel of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York in an evaluation of our current mode of
judging negligence cases said:
"We are still trying automobile cases as if they had the same legal
and social problems and occurred- in the same volume as accidents aris-
ing out of the use of the horse and buggy. We have a rule of contrib-
utory negligence which has as much significance to the social fact of
the automobile on the streets as the rule in Shelley's case." 28
As with any rule of law, difficulties arise in its administration and
there are undoubtedly different approaches to the same end. Before a
jurisdiction adopts the rule, it is Advisable to evaluate the form in which it
has been operating in those situations where the rule is already utilized
with an eye toward preventing obvious mistakes in interpretation. Dean
Prosser, who has long advocated adoption of the comparative negligence
rule, after a study of the ways in which it is being executed today, has made
suggestions for improvement.2 9  Avoidance of the terms "slight" and
"gross" in describing the negligence of the parties as well as the "lesser"
negligence of the plaintiff are strongly urged since these terms lead only to
difficulty in application. Coupling a comparative negligence rule with a
procedure for handling multiple party suits is also discouraged. He con-
siders the problems which it raises too intricate to be handled with appor-
tionment of damages.
27. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
28. 2 BAR BULLETIN, N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS ASS'N 81 (1953).
29. See 51 MicH. L. REv. 465 (1953).
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Use of the special verdict is recommended in order to keep the jury
under control while utilizing the apportionment procedure. This form of
control has been successfully employed in Wisconsin for some time.8 ° For
example, in an automobile accident case the following special issues are
put to the jury: whether the defendant was negligent with respect to the
speed of his car; if so, was this a cause of the accident; was the plaintiff
negligent in entering the intersection; if so, was the plaintiff's negligence
a cause; if all of these questions are affirmatively answered then what per-
centage of the total negligence was attributable to the defendant and what
percentage to the plaintiff; what is the amount of damage which the plain-
tiff has sustained. With responses to these questions on the record, the
jury cannot reach its verdict in secrecy leaving the court unaware of
whether its instructions were followed and whether the law was correctly
applied to the facts. A more precise verdict will be forthcoming or the
grounds for overriding the vedict will be much more evident.
The rule of comparative negligence now stands as a useful and neces-
sary part of the law of negligence. The hardships which were worked
by strict adherence to the principles of contributory negligence were ap-
parent at an early date, and juries are not unknown to have granted re-
covery in negligence cases while making allowance for the degree to which
the plaintiff was responsible. A most frank appellate recognition of this
unofficial action by juries is found in three recent Pennsylvania cases. In
each case the court held that the fact that the size of the verdict was possibly
influenced by the evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was not
a sufficient basis for a refusal to overthrow a denial of a motion for a new
trial on the ground that the verdict was inadequate 3 1 Such an unauthor-
ized apportionment of damages is not advisable both because of the loss of
respect for the law which it creates and because of the injustice to one who
does not receive like treatment in another similar case.
There is no reason why any jurisdiction should permit a continuance
of the cold refusal to make any adjustment for a plaintiff who has in some
way helped to place himself in the situation for which he seeks redress. It
is the duty of the courts to afford justice and not to make examples of neg-
ligent plaintiffs. The comparative negligence rule stands as an answer to
the problem, awaiting only its adoption by the legislatures in order to per-
mit the courts to put it into operation.
Arthur R. Flores
30. Webster v. Roth, 246 Wis. 535, 18 N.W.2d 1 (1945); Tomany v. Camozzi,
238 Wis. 611, 300 N.W. 508 (1941) ; Schulz v. General Casualty Co., 233 Wis. 118
288 N.W. 803 (1939).
31. Ewing v. Marsh, 174 Pa. Super. 589, 101 A.2d 391 (1953) ; Karcesky v.
Laria, 114 A.2d 150 (Pa. 1955) ; Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 61
A.2d 861 (1948) ; Carpenelli v. Scranton Bus Co., 350 Pa. 184, 38 A.2d 44 (1944).
In the Ewing case note the language at p. 392; "It is also possible that the size
of the verdict was influenced by the evidence of the decedent's contributory negli-
gence. Although this issue was decided on the plaintiff's favor by the verdict
against the defendants, it may properly be considered by the appellate court."
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